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Toronto
This article deals with the therapeutic significance of claims for damages and
other types of compensation, and ofthe processes relating to claims . It examines
the influences of legal structures and processes in promoting the recovery of a
patient/clientfrom disablement, or in alleviating or aggravating the development
of a disability . It is concerned in particular with the spill-over influences of
claims on the formation of medical opinions, on the selection of treatment, on
patients' responses to treatment, and on rehabilitation .
The article examines the assumption that compensation systems promote a
widespread psychological problem of "secondary gain", "monetary gain", or
` `compensation neurosis" . The author explains why the assumption exists and he
examines its validity.
The article provides a commentary relevant to the conduct ofclaims, and it
also seeks to identify the therapeutic significance ofstructural alternatives in the
design of compensation systems .
L'auteur de cet article traite de la signification thérapeutique des recours en
dommages-intérêts, ou autres types d'indemnisation, et desprocédures relatives
à ces recours . Il étudie la part d'influence des structures etprocéduresjuridiques
dans le processus de guérison des dommages corporels subis par le patient ou
client, c'est-à-dire dans l'allègement ou l'aggravation du développement de son
invalidité . Il s'intéresse en particulier à l'expansion de cette influencejuridique,
tant sur laformation des opinions médicales et sur le choix du mode de traitement
que sur la réponse des patients au traitement et sur la réhabilitation .
I; auteur examine l'hypothèse que les systèmes d'indemnisation suscitent
trèsfréquemment un problèmepsychologique de "profit secondaire", de "profit
financier", ou "névrose d'indemnisation" . L'auteur explique l'existence de cette
hypothèse et en scrute la validité .
* Terence G. Ison, of Osgoode Hall LawSchool, York University, Toronto, Ontario.
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Lacttettr fournit ainsi un commentaire pertinent concernant la conduite de
ces réclamations d'indemnité, tout en cherchant à déterminer la valeur thérapeutique
de types de solutions différents dans la conception des systèmes d'indemnisation .
A . Introduction
1 . General Significance
Lawyers are accustomed to perceive of their relationshp with the
medical profession as one in which physicians are expert witnesses, playing
an ancillary role in legal processes . The purpose of this article is to view
the process of medico-legal interaction from the opposite perspective; to
examine legal structures in terms of their significance for medical care
and rehabilitation . Does a patient's receipt or expectation of damages or
other compensation for disablement affect the way in which physicians
form opinions on diagnosis or etiology? Does it operate to alleviate or
aggravate the incidence of disablement? Does it affect the prescription of
treatment, or patients' responses to treatment? Do structural or operation-
al features of legal systems relating to claims for compensation have any
influence on diagnosis, on opinions relating to etiology, on the incidence
of disablement, on treatment or the response to treatment? These are
some of the questions that prompted this article .
The research for this work has included a review of medical, legal
and social science literature, augmented by attendances at places of medi-
cal treatment, by interviews with physicians and other treatment person
nel, and with patients . While the fieldwork was done predominantly in
Canada, the literature searches included other Commonwealth countries,
the United States, and Scandinavia . This has extended the input of infor-
mation and ideas and has permitted confirmation on many points, but it
has of course the disadvantage that some of the observations that follow
may not apply in the jurisdiction of particular interest to the reader.
Much of this discussion might appear relevant to the discipline of
medicine rather than law, but there are substantial reasons for lawyers to
take more than a passive interest . First, it is important for practising
lawyers to understand the significance of what they do in terms of its
impact on the medical care and rehabilitation of their clients . Secondly,
an academic lawyer may have a better vantage point than a physician
from which to envisage the solution of problems through changes in legal
structures .
This article relates primarily to tort liability and workers' compensa-
tion, though much of the discussion is also relevant in the context of
automobile accident plans, long-term disability insurance, sick pay, and
other systems of compensation .
One conclusion to emerge from this research is that claims for com-
pensation and the processes of pursuing claims are not a major influence
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on the course of a disability in most cases . More significant variables
include the nature of the organic disability, its significance for vocational
opportunities, the capacity of the medical profession in relation to diagno-
sis and treatment, pre-morbid job satisfaction of the patient, family sup-
port, and other cultural, personal, environmental and econmic factors .
Nevertheless, claims for compensation and the processes relating to them
are a significant influence on the development of many disabilities and a
major influence on some . It is important in any discussion of system
design, therefore, to consider the significance of alternative structures in
terms of their influence on medical care and rehabilitation .
While much of this article relates to psychological disability, com-
pensation structures may have a significant influence on medical opinions
relating to diagnosis -and etiology, even with regard to organic disabilities .
B . Influence on Diagnosis and Opinions on Etiology
Forming an opinion on diagnosis and etiology can require an oral as
well as visual examination of the patient . The oral examination may relate
to how, when and where the injury occurred, contemporaneous and sub
sequent symptoms, and any prior history of problems in the same part of
the body . In a disease case, the inquiry may relate also to exposure
history . In this context, acompensation system that is etiologically based,
such as workers' compensation or tort liability, creates an obvious incen-
tive for a patient to have disabilities attributed to a compensable cause.
This might influence the selection and emphasis with which a patient
informs an examining physician of the facts . 1 In some cases, the influ-
ence of a compensation system might go further to produce wishful
thinking, the concealment of relevant facts, or lies . Conversely, suspicion
in the mind of an examining physician that a patient is influenced by
monetary gain might result in a patient being disbelieved when he is
telling the truth. The proportion of cases in which such a question of
credibility might arise is not a fringe minority. Indeed, probably about
one-third to one-half of claims for workers' compensation involve disa-
bilities in respect of which an opinion on diagnosis and etiology depends,
wholly or primarily, on the facts related by the patient. .
An aggravating factor is that some of the traditional ways of testing
the credibility of claimants can be useless and counter-productive . For
example, a common method is to compare the symptoms of which the
patient complained immediately following trauma with those of which he
complained later. The mention of a new symptom later is often viewed as
cause for suspicion . Yet pain resulting from trauma may not be felt
instantly . A traumatic experience can have a numbing effect, or an injury
may be sustained in circumstances that create distractions . Later, when
1 see, e .g ., H.D . Lomas and J.D . Berman, Diagnosing for Administrative Purposes :
The Process and Problems (1982), 23 Comprehensive Psychiatry 545.
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the numbing effect has worn off, or the distractions have discontinued,
the pain is felt . Also the contemporaneous statement of symptoms may be
abbreviated or edited by the person making the record, often a first-aid
attendant . Later, the patient may be making the same complaints but they
are more fully recorded . There is often a reluctance on the part of adjudi-
cators, or those opposing a claim, to accept that the pain of which the
patient complained subsequently, or which was only recorded subse-
quently, is genuine and attributable to the trauma because "he never
complained of that at the time" .
Compensation systems also create suspicions of and among different
sectors of the medical profession . The opinions of general practitioners
are often discounted by an assumption that they are lenient to their pa
tients or gullible, while the opinions of company doctors, workers' com-
pensation board dotors or insurance company doctors are often attributed
to a bias against compensation .
There are also more systematic ways in which compensation systems
impair the receipt of relevant information by attending physicians . For
example, the risk of compensation claims is one of the reasons for resis
tance in the political process to any regulations that would require content
labelling of industrial chemicals. Without such labelling, a patient may be
unable to inform his physician of any relevant exposure history . Similarly
the risk of tort liability is one of the reasons for resisting patients' rights to
their medical records . Yet the clinical findings of an attending physican
may never reach another physician subsequently dealing with the same
matter unless they are communicated via the patient, particularly if the
patient has moved to a new area . Again, the risk of compensation is one
of the reasons why some companies have sometimes withheld evidence of
occupational disease from the workers affected . = In many and probably
most such instances, where the information is not available to the patient
and hence not communicated by the patient to the advising physician, it
will not reach that physician in any other way.
Compensation systems that are etiologically based also contribute in
other ways to the under-recognition of occupational etiology in disease
cases .3 For example, a positive opinion by an attending physician on
diagnosis and etiology is generally subject to scrutiny in the process of
claims adjudication . Commonly a negative opinion or no opinion is not.
Similarly in medical literature, positive medical opinions on the indus-
'` See, e.g ., Brief of the United Steelworkers of America to the Royal Commission
on the Confidentiality of Health Records (April 1978, Ontario), p . 23 .
3 It has been estimated in the United States that 'lo]nly five percent of those
severely disabled from an occupational disease receive workers' compensation benefits":
U.S . Department of Labour, An Interim Report to Congress on Occupational Disease
(1980), p. 3 . This picture is not confined to the U.S . See . e.g ., T.G . Ison, The Dimen-
sionsof Industrial Disease (1978, Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University, Ontario) .
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trial etiology of a disease are likely to be subjected to close scrutiny.
Comparable resources are not always allocated to the scrutiny of negative
opinions . The prospect of compensation appears to stimulate a body of
negative or over-cautious etiological literature, and this in turn is repro-
duced in the standard medical texts. For example, if it were not for the
prospect of compensation, it would probably have been recognized more
readily that bronchitis andemphysema can result from employment expo-
sures. Moreover, some "medical" literature is written avowedly for the
purpose of reducing compensation costs. 4
Another factor contributing to the under-recognition of occupational
disease is a propensity in many members of the. medical profession to
believe that for a disability to be compensable under an etiologically
based system, a positive opinion requires that occupational causation be
established with certainty, or at least with a high degree of probability.
There is a reluctance to accept the balance of probabilities usually pre-
scribed by law, and a reluctance to accept the usual criteria of the medical
profession .' This has even been carried to the point of recommending that
an invasive surgical procedure be used to clinch the matter, notwithstand-
ing that an affirmative opinion on diagnosis and etiology is already war-
ranted by other data as the best available hypothesis .
Even if the clinical and roentgenographic findings are typical of a specific pneumo-
coniosis, lung biopsy is sometimes advisable for medicolegal determinations of the
cause of the disability:6
Similarly it is sometimes asserted in "medical" literature that an
affirmative opinion on occupational etiology cannot be given unless ex-
posure records are available. For example :
Unless the otologist has knowledge of the employee's occupational history and time
weighted average of noise exposure he cannot make a valid diagnosis of OHL
[occupational hearing loss] .
As a practical matter, such exposure records are seldom available for the
relevant past time periods, and if available, are often of unknown accuracy .
To the extent that compensation structures induce errors in medical
opinions, either directly or via medical literature, the results for a com-
pensation system are obvious . They include the denial of claims and the
failure to file claims where compensation is lawfully due, and the pay-
ment of compensation that is not lawfully due. The consequences, how-
4 See, e.g ., J. Sataloff, WC Hearing Loss Claims Should be Handled With Care,
[March 1984] Occupational Health and Safety, p. 35 .
5 See, e.g ., (1) G.A . Lillington andR.W. Jamplis, ADiagnostic Approach to Chest
Diseases (2nd ed ., 1977), p. 365; (2) H.C . Hinshaw, Diseases of the Chest (3rd ed .,
1969), c. 37 . There is, of course, also an understandable and legitimate reluctance to
reach a positive diagnosis when a disease would inevitably be terminal ; ibid ., p . 433 .
6 Lillington and Jamplis, ibid ., p . 365.
7 Sataloff, loc. cit., footnote 4, at p. 35 .
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ever, go beyond compensation decisions . In particular, under-recognition
of the occupational etiology of disease is a negative influence on preven-
tion . Though probably less frequently, an erroneous opinion on diagnosis
or etiology can also result in an erroneous prescription of treatment .
C . Treatment
Compensation can also be relevant to treatment in other ways . In
particular, it can operate to limit the treatment choices of claimants. For
example, some physicians strive to avoid automobile accident cases, or
workers' compensation cases, sometimes because of the time that may be
involved in subsequent controversies . Again, it has been estimated that
only about twelve psychiatrists out of over three hundred in Metropolitan
Toronto are willing to deal with the Workers' Compensation Board.'
The control exercised by some workers' compensation boards over
elective surgery has also been a restraint on patient choice, though on the
whole this restraint has probably been beneficial . In particular, the boards
played a leading role in saving patients from unnecessary and damaging
back operations . Occasionally, however, it is alleged that this restraint
goes too far. 9
A . Introduction
11 . Legal System Etiology in Non-Organic Disablement
Probably the greatest medical significance of the receipt or denial of
compensation, or the expectation of compensation, or various features of
compensation systems, lies in the creation, aggravation or alleviation of
neurotic or other psychological disorders.
There is no doubt that the receipt of compensation is generally a
positive influence . Indeed, it can be seen as an essential first step in
successful rehabilitation .' ° For example, among workers' compensation
claimants whose disabilities are not disputed or disputable, such as the
paraplegics and the amputees, the prompt commencement of compensa-
tion payments relieves the financial concerns that form part of the anxie-
ties commonly suffered by others with similar disabilities . Conversely,
the denial of compensation can obviously be a cause of anxiety and
depression . This can be aggravated for a claimant who applies succes-
sively under several compensation systems and receives a series of deni-
s From an official source .
y For example, in Ontario there is a controversy about the refusal of the Board to
recognize the sclerosing of ligaments as a legitimate treatment for certain low back
conditions .
" See, e .g ., C .G . Magee, United Kingdon: Determination, Evaluation, and Rating
of Disabilities (1961), 30 Industrial Medicine and Surgery 46, at pp . 46 and 47 .
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als, perhaps because the disability does not qualify under the perimeter
rules of each system .
Most medical literature on the subject, however, refers to the nega-
tive potential of compensation, particularly in relation to "secondary
gain" . This phenomenon might be described as the subconscious devel
opment, exaggeration or prolongation of .disability symptoms in response
to some benefit or expectation of benefit. The benefit may take a variety
of forms, such as family compassion or relief from duties . t' For present
purposes, however, the relevant benefit is monetary compensation, 12 and
where this is the case, the phenomenon might be described as "monetary
gain" . It differs from fraud or malingering in that the symptoms de-
scribed by the patient are genuinely felt, and the link between the gain
and the symptoms is not a process of conscious reasoning . Sometimes the
term "compensation neurosis" is used to describe this phenomenon, but
that term is also sometimes used in relation to psychological problems
resulting from the process of claiming compensation rather than the re-
ceipt or expectation of payment.
Apart from disease cases, compensation neurosis andmonetary gain
seem to be the area in which compensation systems have the most wide-
spread influence on opinions relating to diagnosis and etiology .
The medical literature includes various classifications and descrip-
tions of psychological conditions following trauma, or that are otherwise
associated with disability or with compensation . 13 For present purposes,
they can be referred to collectively as psychological disorders . In work-
ers' compensation files" and elsewhere these disorders have commonly
been referred to by the non-diagnostic, non-descriptive, and insinuating
phrase "functional overlay" . 15
Every significant disability has a psychological component which
may interact with organic causes of pain, possibly with synergistic effect,
in ways that are seldom obvious . Moreover, it is part of contemporary
thought in the medical profession that the psychological component in a
disability may develop as an independent disease entity, continuing even
beyond the duration of the organic cause.'6 This is sometimes referred to
1 1 See, e.g ., S.Z . Nagi and L.W. Hadley, Disability Behavior : Income Change and
Motivation to Work (1971-72), 25 Industrial and Labor Relations Rev. 223 .
1 '- See, e.g ., S .E Brena etal., Conditioned Responses to Treatment in Chronic Pain
Patients : Effects of Compensation for Work-related Accidents (1979), 44 Bulletin of the
Los Angeles Neurological Societies 48 .
is See, e.g ., L. Keiser, The Traumatic Neurosis (1968) .
1° See, e.g ., T.G . Ison, Information Access and the Workmen's. Compensation Board,
Research Publication No . 4, 1979, Commission on Freedom of Information and Individ-
ual Privacy, Ontario, p. 93 .
15 See, e.g ., M.R . Trimble, Post-Traumatic Neurosis (1981), p. 53 .
16 Lecture by Hamilton Hall to the Civil Justice Section, Canadian Bar Association,
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as "chronic pain syndrome" . If such a disease exists, however, it is
questionable to what extent this and other psychological disorders follow-
ing injury should be attributed to monetary gain .
B . Dubious Attribution ofMonetary Gain
There are two broad categories of compensation claimants who ap-
pear to cling to their disabilities as a source of income, and who might be
perceived as justifying a perception of monetary gain as widespread :
(1) Those who want to work but have no job to return to and no prospect
of employment. This group is a large one when unemployment is
high .
(2) Those who are worn down and no longer fit for the manual jobs that
have been their lifestyle .
With regard to the second group, people do not begin their working
lives with uniform physique, nor do they age at a uniform rate . Some are
fit for heavy work into their eighties while others find it beyond them
when they have reached their forties . Someone who suffers a significant
back disability at the age of say fifty-three may find that he cannot qualify
for retirement or disability income, nor can he find any available light
work. His only hope of obtaining income while avoiding welfare lies in a
compensation claim .
To whatever extent these situations create psychological disorders, it
would be more of a political choice than a medieal opinion to attribute
them to a desire for compensation . These disorders could equally well be
attributed to a lack of alternatives ; and if a humane solution is to be found
through changes in system structure, that must be the attribution.
To apply a diagnostic label, such as "monetary gain", "secondary
gain", "compensation neurosis" or "functional overlay", to people in
these two groups serves no curative purpose. Indeed, the patronising and
insinuating character of the label can increase the stress . Another signifi-
cance of these "diagnostic" labels in these situations may be to distribute
the resulting economic losses according to the political judgments of
those who apply the label.
C. Exaggerated Estimates of Monetary Gain
Apart from the two categories mentioned under the previous head-
ing, there are no reliable quantitive data and no other evidence known to
the writer of any widespread incidence of disability symptoms resulting
from monetary gain . There are some studies showing that workers' com-
pensation claimants take longer to recover than other patients with similar
Toronto, November 1983 . See also A. Magora, Investigation of the Relation Between
Low Back Pain and Occupation (1973), 5 Scandinavian Journal of Rehabilitation Medi-
cine 191 .
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disabilities," andfrom these data an inference has been drawn that mone-
tary gain is widespread . These studies, however, do not appear to control
for other relevant variables, such as occupation . Yet the demands of ajob
are a key variable in the determination of fitness for work. A corporate
executive who breaks a leg becomes an executive with a leg in a cast, but
an ironworker who breaks a leg may legitimately have to abstain from his
usual occupation until the fracture has healed .
There are other reasons, too, why some categories of compensation
claimants may take longer to recover and which have nothing to do with
compensation . For example, the perception of work as causative may be
significant. Regardless of compensation, a bricklayer's labourer whoknows
that his work caused his painful back condition can be expected to show
more caution in returning to that work than ayoung insurance broker who
suffered the same injury on a rugby field and who knows that his work
had no causative significance . is This factor may help to explain why
immigrants, who are found in disproportionate numbers in high-risk oc-
cupations, are commonly perceived as more prone than native-born work-
ers to psychological impairment in bad back cases . 19 Again, it could be
the process of obtaining compensation, rather than the receipt or expecta-
tion of the money, that tends to delay recovery in some cases.
Feelings of rage, aggression, fear, guilt, and other strong feelings engendered by the
accident are exacerbated by negotiations over workmen's compensation, resulting
in increased psychic tension, which can increase symptoms . Although reflected as a
generalized response in the whole body, it is most keenly felt in the low back
muscles . . .zo
Experience rating can be another negative influence . Often it stimu-
lates the development of schemes under which employers reward supervi-
sors, foremen or workers for the absence of reported injuries . When an
injury threatens the loss of any such reward, some resentment against the
injured worker may occur, particularly in a case of soft tissue injury . This
resentment can be another factor discouraging a return to work .
For all of these reasons, it would be absurd to use data showing only
that compensation claimants take longer to recover than other people with
similar disabilities as evidence that compensation claimants are motivated
17 See, e.g ., E.M . Krusen et al ., Compensation Factor in LowBack Injuries (1958),
166 Journal of the American Medical Association 1128 ; W. Hammonds et al ., Compensa-
tion for Work-Related Injuries and Rehabilitation of Patients with Chronic Pain (1978), 71
Southern Medical Journal 664; Brena, loc. cit., footnote 12 .
is For a discussion of social class variables that may also influence a return to work,
see T. Honig-Parnass, The Relative Impact ofStatus and Health Variables Upon Sick-Role
Expectations (1983) ; 21 Medical Care 208, at p. 222.
19 See, e.g ., A. Rubinstein, Mediterranean Back and Other Stereotypes : A Review
of the Australian Literature Dealing with Industrial Back Injuries (1982), 17 Journal of
Social Issues 295.
20 Keiser, op . cit., footnote 13, p. 147 .
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by monetary gain . Moreover, there are other studies suggesting that rates
of recovery from disability are not significantly different as between those
receiving or claiming compensation and those with similar disabilities in
similar occupations who are not receiving or expecting compensation .-I
The anecdotal evidence reporting the most widespread incidence of
monetary gain comes from psychiatrists and other medical specialists
who see only a small pre-selected sample of hard cases . The writer has
been advised by physicians who see a more representative sample of
workers' compensation claimants, particularly the administrators of work-
ers' compensation board clinics, that the majority of claimants want to
recover and return to work22 and only a minority (probably about ten per
cent) do not . Even those physicians only see a sample that is weighted in
favour of the hard cases, and many of the ten per cent minority within that
sample could 'be de-motivated by factors other than monetary gain, in
particular. no job to return to and the lack of available employment for
which they are suited .
A diagnosis of monetary gain, secondary gain, or compensation
neurosis is commonly not a positive diagnosis supported by any apparent
symptoms, but a diagnosis reached by exclusion . Medical literature, medi
cal opinions, and the medical conclusions of courts and administrative
tribunals commonly recognize only two broad etiological categories :
(1) diagnosed organic causes, and
(2) psychological causes .23
In this contextual framework, complaints of pain or other symptoms of
disability that do not result from any diagnosed organic cause must result
from a psychological cause, probably monetary gain, or the patient is
malingering. Indeed, there is a remarkable correlation in the medical
literature between the use of this twofold etiological classification and the
perception of monetary gain as widespread .
There is, however, recognition in some of the medical literature, and
perhaps growing recognition, of a third broad etiological category, that is
non-diagnosed organic cause. Moreover, this category may be a large
one. The records of workers' compensation boards include many cases
initially perceived as psychological or as malingering, and which are
subsequently diagnosed as organic disabilities ." There have also been
=1 See, e .g . . C.V. Horn and A. Glass, Analysis of Factors Concerned with Delay in
Return to Work After Injury and Their Relation to Claims for Compensation (1971), 3
Injury : The British Journal of Accident Surgery 9.
22 For other research supporting the view that disabled people generally want to
return to work regardless of economic need, see Nagi and Hadley, loc. cit., footnote 11 .
=' See, e .g ., V.J . Derebery et al ., Delayed Recovery in the Patient with a Work
Compensable Injury (1983), 25 Journal of Occupational Medicine 829.
24 Many such examples are within the experience of the writer.
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some quantitive estimates . In one sample studied, it was found that twenty-
five per cent of the cases initially diagnosed as psychological were subse-
quently diagnosed as organic disabilities, and in another sample it was
forty-eight per cent . 25
The conditions most often mislabeled as hysteria appear to be those involving
degenerative conditions affecting skeletal, muscular, and connective tissues, the
spinal cord and peripheral nerves .26
Another circumstance from which an inference of monetary gain is
sometimes drawn is that compensation claimants sometimes present them-
selves for treatments, such as physiotherapy, to an extent beyond that
which is required as a response to any diagnosed organic disability . Part
of the explanation here, however, may be that the attendances are not the
choice of the patient but are required, or thought to be required, for
benefit control purposes by a compensation board or insurance company.27
Again, it has been alleged in defence literature that compensation
neurosis (including monetary gain) is usually inversely proportionate to
the gravity of any organic disability .2x Yet the category of cases in which
monetary gain is commonly believed to occur on the broadest scale is that
of bad backs. A notorious feature of these cases is that attending physi-
cians commonly perceive of the disabilities . as minor (which in some
ways may be correct) while the patients commonly see them as major.
Indeed, these conditions are sometimes perceived by patients as threaten-
ing an end of their employment capabilities . If a patient understands a
physician to perceive as minor a condition which the patient is convinced
is a major disability, this factor alone could explain why a patient may
proceed to exaggerate his symptoms.
Also in bad back cases, the difficulty in arriving at a diagnosis is
sometimes accompanied by difficulty in responding to the pleas of the
patient for curative treatment . It is an observable phenomenon in the
medical profession, as well as in the legal profession, that there is some-
times a propensity to turn on a client who presents a problem that the
professional is unable to solve-to perceive of this client as something of
a nuisance, andperhaps also to perceive of the problem as psychologica1 . 29
25 C.G . Watson and C. Buranen, The Frequency and Identification ofFalse Positive
Conversion Reactions (1979), 167 Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 243, at pp .
244-246.
'-6 Ibid ., at p. 246.
'-7 In some insurance policies, it is a condition of eligibility for continuing benefits
that the claimant be under the care of a physician, and insurance companies have been
known to invoke this clause as a ground for terminating a claim even in a case where
further medical care for the disability may be useless . See, e.g ., Taaffe v. Sun Life
Assurance Co . of Canada (1979), 100 D.L.R . (3d) 133, at p. 145 (Ont . H.C.) .
'-s See, e.g ., H. Miller, Accident Neurosis, [19611 British Medical Journal 919, at
pp . 992-998 .
29 See, e.g ., B.E . Finneson, Low Back Pain (2nd ed ., 1981), p . 180.
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Lastly, medical literature and opinions often reflect the socio-economic
and political views of the authors, and sometimes these include a disdain
for the provision of unearned income or damages to working people . 30
This may contribute not only to the misdiagnosis of organic disabilities as
psychological, but also to the increase of psychological disorders.
If the patient feels that his doctor is tending to minimize damage claims because of
indifference or, worse, because of a loyalty elsewhere, a genuine and substantial
barrier to the patient's recovery is produced ."
If disability symptoms resulting from monetary gain really were
widespread, one would expect the symptoms to disappear after the receipt
of damages or other compensation . When this does not happen, it is
commonly explained on the ground that the symptoms must have become
entrenched rather than as an indicator that the initial diagnosis of mone-
tary gain was wrong. Psychiatric opinions to the effect that the condition
will be cured by a monetary award are commonplace, and so too are
decisions of courts and administrative tribunals to that effect. Yet there
appears to be no substantial evidence that this happens ,to any significant
extent . Quantitive studies have been equivocal, some showing some alle-
viation of the symptoms after a monetary award, others showing that the
symptoms continued . 33 The weight of the evidence, however, supports
the view that the symptoms commonly continue . 34
Anecdotal evidence is hard to evaluate because many of the medical,
legal and other professionals who see patients during the recovery and
30 For a classic example, see J. Collie, Malingering and Feined Sickness (2nd ed .,
1917):
Many a self-indulgent and lazy fellow, who never had an honest impulse for genuine
hard work, seizes the opportunity which a slight accident affords to convince him-
self, consciously or unconsciously, that he need not work . (p . 15).
Surely it is the duty of medical men to help the State to count amongst her citizens the
maximum number of units capable of working. . . .Actions for damages carry in their
train, in a large proportion of cases, a moral degradation of the working-man which
is truly pitiable . (p . 30).
31 M.H . Miller and C. Fellner, Compensable Injuries and Accompanying Neurosis :
The Problem of Continuing Incapacity Despite Medical Recovery, [1968] Wisconsin Law
Rev. 184, at p. 190.
32 See, e .g ., Slipman v . London Transport Executive, 1951, Court of Appeal No.
207, reported in D.A . Kemp and M.S . Kemp, The Quantum of Damages in Personal
Injury Claims, vol. 1 (1954), p. 361 . Since issues of this kind are generally perceived as
relating to "the facts", they are not commonly discussed in the appellate judgments that
reach the law reports .
33 See, e.g ., Trimble, op . cit ., footnote 15, p. 114; Keiser, op, cit., footnote 13, pp .
59-60; J.I . Balla and S. Moraitis, Knights in Armour : A Follow-up Study of Injuries After
Legal Settlement, (1970), 57(2) Medical Journal of Australia 355; W.A.R . Thomson,
Accident Neurosis (1982), 22 Medical Science and Law 143; I. Macnab, The Whiplash
Syndrome (1973), 20 Clinical Neurosurgery 232, at p. 234.
34 See, e.g ., G. Mendelson, Not "Cured by a Verdict" : Effect of Legal Settlement
on Compensation Claimdnts, (1982), 69(2) Medical Journal of Australia 132.
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litigation phase of a disability commonly lose contact once the compensa-
tion claim has been resolved . Hence their opinions may not be well
informed . Even where the contact is maintained and there- is continuing
observation, it would be a mistake to assume that an end of complaints
about the symptoms indicates a cure . It may indicate only that the point of
complaining is now gone . Similarly if a patient was attending a psychia-
trist, not in the expectation of cure, but on referral, perhaps initiated by a
lawyer, to secure the psychiatric reports necessary to prove the claim, the
discontinuance of those attendances when that purpose has expired would
not indicate any cure of the disability .
One aspect of this, relevant to practising lawyers and claims' adjudi-
cators, is that medical opinions in this subject area must often be scruti-
nized and questioned to determine whether they reflect an intelligent and
sensitive diagnosis in the particular case, or whether they contain a stan-
dard response, merely reflecting the cultural environment, the economic
and political outlook, and the value preferences of the physician .
I9 . Significance of the Assumption that Monetary Gain is Widespread
If it is correct that the extent of monetary gain is grossly over-
estimated, this is harmful in several ways . First, the misdiagnoses in
individual cases may produce erroneous decisions on treatment . Second
ly, where the condition is wrongly determined to be non-compensable,
and this is generally the case where the condition is perceived as mone-
tary gain, there is injustice in the denial or under-estimation of compensa-
tion . Thirdly, there is the therapeutic damage done by the "diagnosis"
itself in the individual case . Fourthly, the belief that monetary gain is
widespread appears to result in system practices being established which
are themselves a cause of therapeutic damage. These last two points
require further comment.
One consequence of the belief that monetary gain is widespread is a
pervasive practice of treating every compensation claim with suspicion,
except where the claim relates to a diagnosed organic disability and the
reaction of the patient is within the. normal range of expected reaction .
This practice is commonly alleged against . some company doctors, work-
ers' compensation boards and insurance companies . 35 In workers' com-
pensation in Canada, the practice is found among industries that are
subject to experience rating . Sometimes this suspicion leads to proposals
for treatment that would be so insulting and humiliating to patients that if
the proposed treatment were adopted it would be bound to increase anxi-
ety and resentment . For example:
It is further suggested that ambulatory benefits recipients might be required where
possible, to report to the employers' health unit and spend the workshift sitting idly,
3s For example, "The WCB starts from the premise that the guy is lead swinging";
per the director of a rehabilitation clinic in Ontario.
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while not working. This could possibly serve to deter those who are capable of
gainful employment from abusing compensation . 36
If a patient is treated in this manner, or is treated with suspicion in
any other manner at his place of employment, any repetition of the suspi-
cion by a workers' compensation board or insurance company can be
particularly damaging . As a family doctor explained in an interview: "It
weighs heavily on patients if no one believes them ." It should be no
surprise if a patient who is constantly disbelieved begins to exaggerate his
symptoms . Moreover, the symptoms may actually become more severe
because the anger and anxiety resulting from the disbelief can enhance the
pain . Thus before long, a diagnosis of malingering can produce a psycho-
logical disorder and a diagnosis of "functional overlay" can become a
self-fulfilling prophecy .
Even when a physician believes the patient, lack of a diagnosis and
lack of precision in the prescription of treatment may leave the patient
with a feeling that he has been disbelieved. This is particularly so if the
patient is told to return to work by a physician who has not made a
sufficiently thorough examination to give any reliable advice and who has
not informed the patient of any diagnosis.
Again, the etiological classifications used in compensation systems
play a damaging role . In the bad back cases in particular, there is often a
consensus on the existence of the disability . Conflict arises from the
belief of the patient that the disability resulted from employment, while a
workers' compensation board or its consultant attributes the disability to
spondylosis or osteoarthritis . Since the patient never felt such excrucia-
ting pain prior to an event that occurred in the course of employment, he
now feels that he is the victim of injustice as well as a bad back . It should
be no surprise if this creates or aggravates emotional problems . When the
reaction to this is unsympathetic and the patient discovers that his condi-
tion has now been re-diagnosed as partly emotional, the incapacity may
be entrenched .
These problems do not disappear after a claim has been allowed. For
example, one claimant interviewed by the writer was intensely disturbed,
several months after the accident, because she had been told by a work
ers' compensation board rehabilitation counsellor that her claim had only
been allowed by giving her the benefit of the doubt. Understandably, she
interpreted this as if she had been branded "suspected of dishonesty" .
Similar problems can arise later in the conduct of a claim. Indeed,
some physicians perceive most compensation cases with ongoing suspicion.
sb D. Schlenoff . Obstacles to the Rehabilitation of Disability Benefits Recipients
(1979), 45:2 Journal of Rehabilitation 56 . at p. 58 . It is alleged by union officials that the
recommended practice is sometimes adopted in Canada, but I am not familiar with any
itemized documentation. Workers' compensation boards generally condemn the practice
as incompatible with sound rehabilitation .
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As early recognition is imperative, successful treatment of such a patient [that is,
one with a disability disproportionate to any apparent organic cause] requires that
the physician have a high index of suspicion when dealing with a compensable
injury of any kind . Chronicity in compensable injury cases should be considered
psychogenic unless the failure to recover can be clearly explained as the normal
response to physiologic insult . 37
Apart from being unscientific, such an approach is bound to be sensed by
the patient, and is surely bound to inflict therapeutic damage.
Among Workers' Compensation Board doctors in Ontario, there now
appears to be a consensus that a patient should never be told that "it's all
in your mind" . Complaints that Boarddoctors actually say this to patients
have dwindled in recent years, but patients often still sense that message .
The damage can be aggravated if a patient is offered a lump sum settle-
ment for a transitory psychological disorder (with the inference that the
disorder will be cured following payment) when the patient is convinced
that the disability is organic .
When people are told that they will get better once they have been paid, it increases
stress, because it involves the insinuation of fraud unless the doctor spells out that
the bureaucratic process is causing the stress .38
It is important also to understand the context in which the suspicion
can impact on a patient. In a bad back case, for example, the patient is
often frightened and depressed. He feels the pain and knows that it is
genuine, and he has been offered no cure . He is fearful that he may no
longer be able to cope with his job. His perception of his self-worth may
have been downgraded by reactions at work and at home, and his recrea-
tional life is in suspense . To gather the impression now that he is per-
ceived by people in authority as a malingering liar can be the last straw in
a series of shattering blows .
When suspicion results in a denial of benefits, the denial and its
economic consequences can produce further emotional stress . Indeed, in
connection with disability insurance, it is now well recognized by some
courts in the United States that arefusal by an insurance company to pay
money when it is due can cause an emotional reaction, which is itself a
compensable disability . Thus a claimant can sometimes recover not only
the money due under the policy, but also exemplary damages for the
emotional distress resulting from the earlier refusal to pay.39
37 Derebery, loc. cit., footnote 23 .
38 Interview with a caseworker in a disabled people's organization .
39 For a discussion of some of these cases, see G.O . Kornblum, The Role of the
Life, Health and Accident Insurer's Medical Director in Extra-contract Claims Litigation
(1979), 62 Transactions of the Association of Life Insurance Medical Directors of Amer-
ica 61 .
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E . Multiplication of Physicians
Any general attitude of suspicion may combine with other features of
some compensation systems (such as a reluctance to accept equivocal
evidence, including equivocal medical opinions) to produce another ma
jor cause of psychological harm, that is, multiplication of the number of
physicians involved . It is well accepted in the medical profession that
increasing the number of physicians who examine a compensation claim-
ant'is itself a cause of psychological damage.
. . .what of the unfortunate workman whose injury is more disabling, shows little
evidence of symptom remission, and demonstrates only equivocal objective signs?
. . .The answers to these questions are too often sought by bringing more experts
into the case . . .
Questions are then asked of the patient in a manner that suggests the patient may be
malingering ; needs less medication than he is actually taking ; could really work in a
more limited capacity if he were motivated to do so, is really looking for a free ride
because ofhis disability ;has seentoo manydoctors ; or is possibly abit "psychiatric" .'
No small part of this tension is engendered in compensation cases by the many
physicians involved .41
Each physical examination raises hopes . If those hopes are dashed, the patient feels
helpless, and that creates anger. If it is turned inwards it becomes depression .42
The problem can begin with a vagueness in the reports of attending
physicians, a vagueness which may itself reflect the influence of some
workers' compensation systems .
They [attending physicians] avoid a positive diagnosis for fear of controversy with
the WCB . Sometimes they avoid a negative diagnosis, also to avoid controversy.
They tend to refer to specialists to avoid the problem.43
If more medical referrals are perceived by the patient as reflecting a
suspicion about his honesty, that can obviously be a further cause of
resentment and anxiety. In some cases, there are also fears of harm from
the repeated examinations .
What really worries me is all those x-rays . I have had far too many x-rays . Every
doctor I saw wanted more x-rays . 44
Claiming compensation can easily double or triple the number of
physicians by whom a patient is examined . Apart from being damaging in
40 D.H . Naftulin, The Psychological Effects of Litigation on the Industrially Injured
Patient (1970), 39 Industrial Medicine and Surgery 167, at p. 168. For an example of
repeated medical examinations leading to a "diagnosis" of functional overlay, see the
Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Victorian Workers' Compensation System
(1984, Melbourne), para . 8.4 .
41 Keiser, op . cit., footnote 13, p . 147 .
42 Interview with psychiatrist .
43 Interview with physician specializing in occupational health .
44 Comments of a workers' compensation claimant reported in H. Casey et al ., Like
It or Lump It (1984, Federated Liquor and Allied Industries Employees Union, Mel-
bourne), p. 11 .
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itself, successive medical examinations can, in workers' compensation
and other insurance cases, result in periodic payments being stopped and
re-commenced, or otherwise interrupted. This could be because the suc-
cessive examinations swing the balance of medical opinion on the case,
or more likely, just because arrangements for the examinations increase
the activity on the claim and the probability of the file being "missing"
when payments are due. Payment interruptions are another prime cause of
increased anxiety.
If a patient claims successively under several systems, repeated medi-
cal examinations can become overwhelming .
Referral to a psychiatrist is sometimes seen to offer hope, but the
timing of this involves a dilemma . If the referral is suggested at an early
stage, the patient is likely to react with resentment . He may feel that he is
being accused or suspected of something sinister, ranging from lunacy to
dishonesty . Alternatively, given the perceived omnipotence of the medi-
cal profession, and given that the attending physician cannot arrive at an
organic diagnosis of a condition that the patient believes to be organic, it
may seem to the patient logical to infer that the attending physician is
incompetent, or motivated by some adverse interest . Moreover, a patient
may be apprehensive that his future employment opportunities will be
jeopardized if he is labelled as one who "saw â .psychiatrist" .as At the
least, application of the psychiatric label to a patient can have negative
implications for the way other people perceive him, and for his own
self-esteem.16 Thus early suggestion of referral to a psychiatrist can add to
a patient's stress, and for this reason, as well as the risk ofpatient refusal,
it tends to be avoided.
The alternative of more examinations and testing for an organic
cause avoids these problems, but it creates others . As a minimum, it may
add to the conviction of the patient that there is something organically
wrong with him.
. . .[the] failure to recognize and treat the emotional sequelae of accidents in the
early stages following injury is unfortunate . Each additional unnecessary physical
examination inflicts more damage to the emotional well-being of the patient . . .47
A common lament of psychiatrists is that they receive this category of
patients only when it is too late for effective treatment .
4s There is cause for concern that medical information of this type is leaked to
security firms, and that it becomes available to potential employers. See, e.g ., Report of
the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Confidentiality of Health Information (1980,
Ontario), vol . 1, pp . 166-493 .
46 See, e.g ., B . Link, Mental Patient Status, Work, and Income : An Examination of
the Effects of a Psychiatric Label (1982), 47 American Sociological Rev. 202.
47 Keiser, op . cit., footnote 13, p. 72 .
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E Delay
The most damaging effect of legal systems on recovery from dis-
ablement is probably delay in the adjudication or settlement of claims . In
interviews with rehabilitation personnel and others engaged in treatment,
delay was the feature of legal systems most consistently mentioned at
their initiative as impeding the recovery of their patients .
In workers' compensation systems in Canada, the vast majority of
claims are paid quickly, with the first cheque issuing well under a month
from the date of injury. However, there appears to be a substantial corre
lation between the minority of claims that involve delay and those that
appear to involve psychological problems . With tort liablity, there is no
volume of claims that are paid quickly . Claims for minor injuries take
months before settlement or trial, and claims for serious injuries usually
take years ."'
Delay has many damaging impacts . If intermediate income is inade-
quate, delay can cause financial distress, particularly if it involves, as it
does in some cases, the loss of household assets or the humiliation of
going on welfare . Financial distress can be a major cause of anxiety. Even
when intermediate income is adequate, delay in the settlement or adjudi-
cation of a claim can impede budgetary planning, which can be an essen-
tial part of rehabilitation planning . With tort claims in particular, even a
patient who is told that he has a good case may find it hard to feel secure
and plan for his future while his lawyer cannot tell him how much he will
receive, when he will receive it, or even guarantee that he will receive
anything at all .
Again, delay can increase the number of medical examinations required,
which in some cases may increase the number of physicians involved,
with consequential increases in psychological harm . Delays in adjudica
tion can also delay the commencement of rehabilitation, particularly in
workers' compensation where eligibility for the rehabilitation services of
the boards usually depends upon eligibility for compensation . Moreover,
delay in the commencement of rehabilitation does not merely delay recov-
ery from the disability . It can have a critical and negative influence on the
permanent outcome, particularly in bad back cases."
Delay, particularly if accompanied by successive medical examina-
tions, can also induce suspicion in the mind of a claimant that he is not
being believed, and hence can induce a perceived need to be more demon
strative in the portrayal of symptoms . While the resulting exaggeration
might be attributed to monetary gain, it could more constructively be
;11 See, e.g ., D. Harris et al., Compensation and Support for Illness and Injury
(1984), pp . 105-109 .
av See, e.g . . A. Jarvikoski et al ., Early Rehabilitation at the Workplace (1980),
Monograph No . 6, World Rehabilitation Fund, New York, p. 6.
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attributed to those features of system design that have caused the delay.
Often these are the need to establish etiology, and in tort claims, the
additional need to establish fault and the quantum of damages.
The waiting period can also be a period of conditioning . If a delay in
adjudication leads to delay in rehabilitation, the result can be to extend
the submissive sick role to which the patient has already become accus
tomed in hospital, and to delay the transition back to initiative, indepen-
dence, and assertion.
Even when rehabilitaiton has commenced independently of compen-
sation, delay in adjudication has a negative influence. The rehabilitation
personnel are encouraging their patient to look forward, to forget the
accident, to focus on residual abilities and potential achievements . Mean-
while, if there is a tort claim, the plaintiff's lawyer may be preparing for
discovery or trial by encouraging his client to look backwards, to remem-
ber the horror of the accident, to focus on his residual disability and to
catalogue his frustrations .
In this connection, it has been recommended in a handbook of basic
trial advocacy that the client should keep a daily diary of every, way in
which the injuries have affected his life, including, howhe gets in and out
of bed, takes a bath, is subject to nervousness etc. It recommends vivid
descriptions ofthe pain etc. : " . . . start at yourhead and, in detail, go down
through all parts of your body . . ." .so While this advice may well be
justified in terms of the tort system, it is bound to be anegative influence
on rehabilitation .
O . Decentralization
In workers' compensation, a major cause of delay, misunderstand-
ings and consequential anxieties has been the centralization of claims
administration, adjudication and payment . Historically, these functions
for each province were concentrated in one head office . The result was
predictable. Evidence and argument are received second-hand, and claim-
ants outside the head office city have the constant frustration of being able
to communicate face to face only with people who have no authority .
A major factor is whether the claimant is able to talk to someone perceived as being
able to resolve the problem. Not understanding the system is a big factor, and the
distance involved in dealing with Toronto has a big impact . . . . workers' compen-
sation is more stressful if there is a long wait . There is also the impersonal dealing
with Toronto."
Fortunately, this problem has been recognized, and there has been a
movement" in the last decade to decentralization .
50 R.M . Dudnik et al ., Anatomy of a Personal Injury Law Suit (1968), p. 20 .
" Inteview with a social worker at a regional rehabilitation centre.
52 In British Columbia, Quebec, and to a lesser extent in Ontario.
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Most of the problems mentioned above reach their height in systems
operating an adversary process. These systems maximize the delay, the
multiplicity of medical examinations, the suspicion, the fear of disbelief
and the pressures to exaggerate . Moreover, these systems emphasize to
the patient that there are people who may be working against the patient's
interest . Perhaps the worst form of this is the surveillance (including
photographing) of claimants, which is commonly undertaken by insur-
ance companies in some jurisdictions ."
Lawyers mitigate some of the problems in many jurisdictions by
using agreed medical reports, or the defence accepts the medical reports
of the plaintiff. Where this does not happen, however, duplicate medical
examinations and conflicting medical opinions can increase the confusion
and consequential anxiety for the patient.
Subjecting the victim to physical examination by the "other side" has been found
to increase his anxiety about recovery, encourage him to delay physical and voca-
tional rehabilitaiton, and create an incentive to exaggerate his symptoms .54
Again, "playing down the gravity of a disability can aggravate people" ."
Moreover :
An interminable legal contest often results with the defense hard at work minimiz-
ing and deprecating the symptoms, and the plaintiff-patient repeatedly documenting
a persistent disability . Such prolonged legal sparring, which often involves an
attack on the patient's validity, may serve to create a more firmly fixed symptom
complex than would occur in a nonadversary situation.56
Similarly, the law reports include cases where the evidence shows
the plaintiff to be suffering from a hysteria due partly to the prolonged
litigation," and "the files of every psychiatrist contain case histories
showing that prolonged exposure to this atmosphere of combat is detri-
mental to the patient' .58 Indeed, it has been estimated that "easily half of
the psychiatric disability ultimately seen by the defense psychiatrist is the
product of the legal system" .59
53 For example, in Australia.
54 Brief by the United Steelworkers of America to the Royal Commission on the
Confidentiality of Health Records (April 1978, Ontario), p. 3 .
55 Per a social worker at a regional rehabilitation centre .
56 Finneson, op . cit., footnote 29, p . 190.
57 See, e.g ., Williams v. Jones Balers (1964), reported in D.A . Kemp and M.S .
Kemp, The Quantum of Damages, Volume One: Personal Injury Claims (3rd ed ., 1967),
p. 653 .
53 Keiser, op, cit., footnote 13, p. 87 . For some further comments on the negative
impact of the adversary system on chronic pain syndrome, see Miller and Fellner, loc .
cit . . footnote 31 .
59 R.R . Parlour et al . . The Role of the Defense Psychiatrist in Workmen's Compen-
sation Cases (1981), 26 Journal of Forensic Sciences 535, at p. 542.
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The anxieties created or aggravated by the adversary system may be
associated with and perhaps partly caused by the ethical corruption that
the system promotes.
While the settlement of a claim can avoid the tribulations of a trial,
the bargaining process can be another cause of anger and anxiety, particularly
if an insurance company begins with a low offer, seen by the claimant as
derisory . In cases that are not settled, anxiety about the trial itself can add
to any neurosis . For example, in a recent case that came to the attention of
the writer, the plaintiff informed his lawyer that he had not slept for the .
three weeks before the trial or for the two weeks of the trial itself ."
If the trial includes conflicting medical evidence, this can add to the
problem.
Litigation can also impede re-employment, thus adding another cause
of anxiety. Some employers, sometimes at the initiative of their insurers,
decline to employ people who are engaged in litigation . This happens
particularly in jurisdictions where insurance companies administer work-
ers' compensaaion in an adversary system."
The adversary system generates not only suspicion, but also a suspi-
cion of the suspicion, and this too can be an impediment to rehabilitation .
For example, "a rehabilitation program often involves doing things at
home, but they won't do it for fear of being watched by an insurance
company" . 64
3.
. . . the present system is marred by temptations to dishonesty that lure into their
snares a stunning percentage of drivers and victims. To the toll of physical injury is
added a toll of psychologial and moral injury resulting from pressures for exaggera-
tion to improve one's case or defense and indeed for outright invention to fill its
gaps or cure its weaknesses . These inducements to exaggeration and invention
strike at the integrity of driver and injured alike, all too often corrupting both and
leaving the latter twice a victim-injured and debased. If one is inclined to doubt
the iiiflüence of these debasing factors, let him compare his own rough-and-ready
estimates of the percentage of drivers who are at fault in accidents and the percent-
age who admit it when the question is put under oath . Of course the disparity is
partly accounted for by self-deception, but only partly . And even this self-deception
is an insidious undermining of integrity, not to be encouraged .6o
Another traumatic element in the whole battle for insurance payments comes in the
hearing room . Here the patient listens in fear as one doctor paints him as a mortally
injured man, while another comes close to calling him a fraud. 62
60 R.E. Keeton and J . O'Connell, Basic Protection for the Traffic Victim (1965), p.
61 Per the plaintiff's lawyers .
62 Keiser, op . cit., footnote 13, p. 107 .
63 See, e.g ., C . Moore, Compensation or Neurosis (1982), 11 Australian Family
Physician 871, at p. 874. Confirmed also by lawyers, union officials and employers
interviewed by the writer in Australia.
64 Per a social worker at a regional rehabilitation centre .
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In tort liability, where the award of damages generally depends upon
establishing fault, the adversary process can inflict psychological harm
on a defendant or third party as well as on the plaintiff. For example, in
one case,65 afour year old girl ran out into the street from her home to buy
ice cream. She was struck by a passing motor vehicle. She sustained
physical injuries and mental impairment of such gravity that the trial
judge described her as totally disabled . She sued the ice cream vendor and
the driver of the car. The defendants joined the mother as a third party
claiming contribution for her alleged negligence in failing to take care of
her child.
In this situation, any positive contribution of the legal system to the
emotional rehabilitation of the family would surely be one that helps the
mother to overcome her guilt feelings, not one that entrenches and expands
them . One can hardly think of anything more damaging to the rehabilita-
tion of the family than a legal hassle, continuing over the next eight and
one-half years, which included an issue of whether negligence on the part
of the child's mother was a contributing cause of her disabilities .
I. Lawvers
Consulting a lawyer does not usually appear to have great signifi-
cance in the development of a disability . At least a review of the literature"
and the enquiries made by the writer did not reveal evidence to warrant
any generalization that consulting lawyers makes personal injury claim-
ants feel better or worse .
The response of a lawyer can, however, be very significant in some
cases. For example, some lawyers are conscious of rehabilitation goals,
show concern for the total rehabilitation of the client, and try to conduct a
tort claim in the most constructive or least damaging manner in that
context. In particular, if rehabilitation requires expensive equipment, some
lawyers may negotiate with a liabilty insurer for that equipment to be
provided immediately without settlement or release of the claim. Con-
versely, if a lawyer appears to be interested in the client only as a source
of income, showing more concern for his time records than for the reha-
bilitation of the client, that may add to the client's stress .67
Given that legal fees tend to be proportionate to the measure of
damages, and given that both tend to be inversely proportionate to suc-
cess in the clinical and vocational recovery of a claimant, there is obvi
ously some potential for a conflict of interest . There are also complaints
65 Arnold v. Teno, [197812 S.C.R . 257. The facts are more fully stated in Teno v.
Arnold (1974) . 55 D.L.R . (3d) 57, 7 O.R . (2d) 276 (Ont . H.C .) .
6' See, e .g ., C.J . Peck et al., The Effect of the Pendency of Claims for Compensa-
tion Upon Behavior Indicative of Pain (1978), 53 Washington Law Rev. 251 .
67 See, e.g ., Keiser. op . rit., footnote 13, p. 85 .
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from rehabilitation personnel that lawyers keep going back and concen-
trating on the negative, and that clients sometimes receive -the impression
that getting better is not going to help their claims . For example: "Law-
yers do not generally overtly discourage clients, but they are not anxious
for them to be outstanding." 6s
With regard to the influence of lawyers on a return to work pending
the outcome of a claim, cases were discovered in the course of this
research in which lawyers had encouraged their clients to return to work
and others in which clients reported having been discouraged by their
lawyers; but there is no evidence known to the writer to warrant any
generalization . Many and perhaps most lawyers see returning to work as a
matter for advice from the medical profession .
Perhaps the most common complaint about lawyers among personal
injury claimants is not keeping the client informed, and not answering
phone calls . Often these clients are already anxious, and any lack of reply
from a lawyer can be very distressing. 69
IIT . Benefit Structures
Benefit structures are generally established primarily by reference to cri-
teria other than their therapeutic impact . Nevertheless, it may be helpful
to summarize here the therapeutic significance of some of the choices.
A . Lump Sums
The use of lump sums as damages in the tort system contributes to
some of the problems described above; such as delay in the resolution of a
claim, multiplicity of medical examinations, and anxieties about the amount .
Sometimes lump sum compensation may also delay rehabilitation, includ-
ing a return to employment . There is anecdotal evidence70 that waiting for
a lump sum settlement is sometimes a disincentive to recovery, though
quantitive studies do not indicate that this is widespread, and some asser-
tions of a widespread impact on clinical recovery are extravagant . ' t
es Per a social worker at a specialized rehabilitation hospital .
ev See, e.g., TL. Cory, Clients' Needs in Facing Stress Often Neglected (1984), 11
National No. 9 (Canadian Bar Foundation), p. 36 .
7° Particularly from interviews with physiotherapists . See alsoM.W. Eaton, Obsta-
cles to the Vocational Rehabilitation of Individuals Receiving Workers' Compensation
(1979), 45 Journal of Rehabilitation 59, at p. 61 . It has been alleged in particular that
lump sums delay rehabilitation for "invisible injuries" ; Report ofthe Tripartite Commit-
tee on the Rehabilitation and Compensation of Persons Injured at Work (1980, South
Australia), p. 27 .
71 E.g. : "After all, if one is partially incapacitated, and a Common Law claim is
one's only asset and security for the future, only a born fool would burst himself to
recover before obtaining his verdict." ; John Ellard, Doctors, Injury and Compensation:
Some Elementary Considerations (1982), 16 Australian and New Zealand Journal of
6)2,8
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Lump sums provide the maximum incentive to rehabilitation after
the lump sum has been paid, but it is only in a tiny minority of cases that
this can be significant . In the vast majority, rehabilitation has been com
pleted long before the lump sum is paid .?'- When that is not so, the patient
has often become so entrenched in his ways during the long wait for the
lump sum that rehabilitation is no longer viable . Assertions that the award
of a lump sum will cure psychological disorders are generally against the
weight of the evidence . 73
On a tort claim, part of the lump sum is for pain and suffering, and
this can be another negative influence on rehabilitation . In particular, the
evidence required to demonstrate the pain and suffering (for example,
how he wept on admission for physiotherapy) can be damaging to the
pride and self-respect that could support the adjustment of the patient to
ongoing life with the disability .
Moreover, it is common in the negotiation of tort claims, except in
very severe cases, to refer to time off work as a rough indicator of the
extent of pain and suffering . Thus a claimant who returns to work promptly
has more to lose than the damages for loss of earnings . For this reason,
tort liability creates an incentive to prolong the absence from work that is
not present in workers' compensation .'"
These negative consequences do not flow from the principle of
compensation for pain and suffering: they result from the way in which it
is measured . If it were measured by reference to the degree of physical
impairment, using a schedule of physical impairments as a guide, and
without evidence of actual pain and suffering in the particular case, most
of these problems could be avoided, or at least their significance could be
reduced."
B . Periodic Payments
Many problems of lump sum compensation can be avoided by the
use of periodic payments . If these take the form of a fixed pension,
indexed for inflation, there is the maximum incentive for clinical recov-
ery and vocational rehabilitation . 76
Psychiatry 260, at p. 261 . The reality is that the overwhelming majority of tort claimants
recover and return to work or other pre-accident activity long before obtaining a settle-
ment or verdict .
7= See, e.g ., T.G . Ison, The Forensic Lottery (1967), p. 25 .
73 See supra, footnote 34 .
74 See also J . O'Connell, A Proposal to Abolish Defendants' Payment for Pain and
Suffering in Return for Payment of Claimants' Attorneys' Fees, [19811 University of
Illinois Law Rev. 333, at p. 341 .
75 See, e.g ., TG . Ison, Accident Compensation : A Commentary on the New Zea-
land Scheme (1980), p. 67 .
" See, e.g ., C. Safilios-Rothschild, The Sociology and Social Psychology of Dis-
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In workers' compensation in Canada there has, unfortunately, been a
movement in recent years to abandon fixed pensions and revert to the
actual loss of earnings method of compensating for permanent disability.
Under this method, periodic payments may be varied annually according
to the estimated loss of actual earnings resulting from the disability : it is
difficult to think of any method of benefit calculation more likely to
perpetuate anxiety . 7' A claimant with a moderate to severe disability may
be confident that as long as he remains unemployed his compensation
benefits will continue. He may be apprehensive, however, that if he
returns to work and then finds that he cannot cope, or if he should lose his
job and be unable to find another in the open labour market, his incapac-
ity for work would, at that stage, be attributed to factors other than his
compensable disability . 78
These fears are probably at their. greatest in etiologically-based sys-
tems, but they are also found in connection with disability insurance .
People [receiving benefits under a policy of disability insurance] have real fears
about going back to work because if they attempt it and find they can't compete,
they are worried that benefits may not be reinstated . 79
The fear is that subsequent unemployment may be attributed to economic
factors, or to a subsequent disability arising outside the period of the
coverage . A related problem is that policies of disability insurance do not
generally pay periodical payments for partial disability. Hence there is a
disincentive to undertake part-time work in cases where this might be
possible, and where it might be a therapeutic benefit to the patient .80 The
same phenomenon has been observed in connection with social security
administration in the United Kingdom, where periodic payments are not
paid for partial disability . 81
The influence of benefit levels on incentives to return to work is
traditionally a controversial matter. There is a strong conviction among
employers' organizations and employers' representatives that rates of
compensation equivalent to one hundred per cent of lost earnings create a
disincentive to return to work . While the evidence in support of this view
is equivocal and controversial, it is probably more valid in relation to
ability and Rehabilitation (1970), p. 35 ; A. Fulkerson, Vocational Rehabilitation in the
Workers' Compensation System (1980), 33 Arkansas Law Rev. 723, at p. 739.
77 For further discussion, see TG . Ison, The Calculation of Periodic Payments for
Permanent Disability (1985), 22 Osgoode Hall L.J . 735.
7s Examples of this fear have been found by the writer, but not enough for any
quantitive estimate .
79 Per a caseworker at an organization of disabled people .
so This emerged from interviews at places of medical treatment.
81 Harris, op . cit., footnote 48, p. 13 .
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minor transitory disabilities than it is in relation to more severe and
prolonged disabilities . s'`
Conversely, a substantial reduction from normal earnings can obvi-
ously be a cause of financial anxiety and despair, particularly among
families at the lower levels of earnings where there is little or no discre
tionary income . Probably the optimum compromise can be reached at a
benefit level of about ninety per cent of projected earnings loss .
C. Welfare
While the welfare system was intended to be a safety net for those in
need, going on welfare is notoriously a cause of additional stress, particu-
larly for disabled people who believe themselves to be eligible for work
ers' compensaaion or other insurance benefits . The means test, and in
some jurisdictions the degradation involved in visiting the office at which
benefits are obtained,83 are additional causes of stress .
Moreover, some welfare authorities have fixed budgets for supple-
mentary aid, with the result that rehabilitation equipment may be denied
for budgeting reasons . Apart from causing emotional distress, this can be
a direct cause of physical health problems, such as pressure sores or other
types of disease. Where extra benefits are provided through supplemen-
tary aid, they may be terminated in the event of return to work . This
feature too can be counter-productive in its influence on rehabilitation .
These negative influences of the welfare system can be seen as a
by-product of the delays and the limitations in coverage that characterize
the etiologically-based systems.
A . Clinical Rehabilitation
IV Rehabilitation Structures
A tort claim may influence the progress of clinical rehabilitation but
it does not usually produce any change in the institutional structure.
Claimants receive treatment in the same way and at the same places as
those without tort claims . A workers' compensation claim, however, can
make a difference to the institutional structure of rehabilitation, particu-
larly in jurisdictions where workers' compensation boards operate their
own rehabilitation clinics. 84
82 This is partly because workers' compensation systems rarely compensate for loss
of fringe benefits, and such losses are more likely in cases of more severe or prolonged
disability .
ss For example, at least some of the offices administering supplementary benefits in
the U.K .
84' In Canada, these are British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario, and New Brunswick.
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The provision of clinical rehabilitation by workers' compensation
boards has several advantages. First, because rehabilitation is perceived
as a way of saving vast sums of money in compensation funds, it is also
perceived as something on which money should be spent. Perhaps for this
reason, the board clinics sometimes have equipment and other facilities
beyond those that are available elsewhere . Some -of the clinics also have
extensive industrial workshops . Thus comprehensive programs of physi-
cal therapy, counselling, job assessment and work practice can be pro-
vided that would be less likely to come about without the linkage of
clinical rehabilitation with the compensation system .
Secondly, disabled workers are commonly classified in compensa-
tion systems and by employers in arbitrary and extreme ways, such as
"unfit for work" or "fit for work", though often with an intermediate
classification, such as "fit for light work" . These classifications are
intended to meet an administrative need, but they can be counter-productive
in relation to a worker who wants to return to work and is apprehensive
about his capacity to cope . These classifications would not generally be
used by, for example, physicians, business executives, or scholars in
relation to themselves. When recovering from a disability, they can ease
their way back to work, doing a little at first, and then building up the
amount as they feel better. Similarly a disabled industrial worker may like
to feel his way back to full employment, perhaps beginning with a little,
working at his own speed; being able to rest or quit at a time of his own
choice, and without being subject to a foreman who has expectations of a
predetermined level of performance . This graduated return to work is,
however, often unattainable in an industrial setting . This is one of the
problems that board clinics, if they work well, can help to overcome .
Thirdly, the administration of clinical rehabilitation by a workers'
compensation board might create a sense of urgency that is crucial to the
momentum of rehabilitation . In bad back cases in particular, there appears
to be a consensus among rehabilitation personnel that the psychological
dimensions of the disablement generally become entrenched if the patient
is left without effective diagnostic and treatment services for about six
months .
These advantages must be balanced, however, against the negative
influences that board clinics may have on the recovery of patients . First,
admission to a board clinic can increase the number of doctors by whom a
patient is examined," and can be disorienting in other ways . For exam-
ple, claims adjudication and rehabilitation counselling may be in the
hands of different people, and if the patient normally lives beyond
85 See heading 11 E above. See also B.H.G . Curry, Workmen's Compensation Board
Hospital and Rehabilitation Clinic, [1973] Medical Trial Technique Quarterly 121, at p.
131 .
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daily travelling distance of the clinic, he may be removed from the
support of family life . The disorientation and multiplication of medical
examinations can be aggravated if the patient has a non-compensable
disability in addition to the compensable disability, and if the non-
compensable disability is being treated concurrently elsewhere .
The administration of a clinical facility by a workers' compensation
board can also increase anxiety in other ways. Patients sometimes assume
that success in treatment will be measured by the termination of compen
sation payments, and that consequently incentives or pressures might
exist for clinic staff to be unduly hasty in classifying patients as recov-
ered . Where this fear exists, patients may react by striving to avoid or
deny partial success in therapy, or otherwise by striving to prove their
disabilities . Again, the connection with the compensation system may
induce a patient to fear that if he is unable to progress to the satisfaction of
the treating doctor, he may be labelled a malingerer.
Other problems, too, can arise if this structure is perceived as a form
of benefit control . Obviously any reduction in candour by patients can
aggravate the difficulties of diagnosis and the prescription of treatment .
There may also be a risk of alternative and more imaginative forms of
rehabilitation, which may have greater potential in some cases, being
overlooked. For example in some cases, where a patient is already too
institutionalized, some form of voluntary work in the local community
could be preferable to the clinical setting as a step towards employment .
Another limitation is that because the board clinics have a captive
clientele, the quality of their output is not monitored by market move-
ments . They are relatively immune from the market pressures that might
compel a sensitivity to client satisfaction, or client perceptions of the
quality of the treatment. This may help to explain the paramilitary atmo-
sphere that has prevailed in some periods at some of the compensation
board clinics. To some extent, however, the political process serves as a
substitute for the lack of market mechanisms for quality control, and even
market mechanisms operate to some extent . For example, it is fairly
common nowadays for a board to accommodate any preference that a
patient may have for treatment elsewhere .
Without allocating enormous resources to an extensive inquiry, it
would be impossible to reach any overall conclusion on whether the
administration of rehabilitation clinics by workers' compensation boards
is desirable, or whether such clinics should be separated entirely from
compensation systems . No doubt too the advantages and disadvantages of
this structure vary with time andplace . For what it is worth, however, the
hunch of the writer is that, on the whole, this structure probably does
more good than harm .
It is also interesting to note that whatever therapeutic damage this
structure might do could to a large extent be avoided by the abolition of
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etiologically-based compensation systems, and their replacement by a
comprehensive plan . A consequence of having a rehabilitation clinic
administered by aworkers' compensation board is that patients are classi-
fied etiologically for the purpose of clinical treatment. This contrasts
dramatically with the classifications that would make the greatest contri-
bution to overall success in rehabilitation . Forexample, diagnostic classi-
fications may sometimes be useful to facilitate specialization and econo-
mies of scale in treatment. Geographical classifications and regional
rehabilitation facilities can have advantages in preserving home contacts .
Perhaps age classifications might have some use . Occupational classifica-
tions may be useful on the theory that those returning to manual labour
require more intensive therapy than those returning to sedentary posi-
tions. Etiology, however, is generally irrelevant to clinical rehabilitation
needs. Thus if the total clientele of clinical rehabilitation facilities is
divided etiologically, there is a proportionate decrease in the use of classi-
fications which could contribute more to the success of rehabilitation for
disabled people as a whole .
A comprehensive plan of compensation for disablement, under which
eligibility for benefits does not depend upon etiology, could preserve the
benefit of connecting clinical rehabilitation with compensation while at
the same time not impairing the use of other classifications that would
maximize the overall success of clinical rehabilitation .
P. Social Rehabilitation
This term refers to assistance to a disabled person in readjustment to
employment, family, recreational and community life . As with clinical
rehabilitation, the administration of rehabilitation services by a workers'
compensation board has substantial advantages compared with a separate
structure. In particular, it tends to create a sense of urgency that is crucial
if damaging delays are to be avoided. Again, having the claims adjudica-
tor and the rehabilitation consultant working under common direction for
the same organization can promote consistency in their communications .
This can minimize the risk of anxieties being created by an adjudicator
and a rehabilitation consultant having different expectations of the patient.
There are, however, significant problems with this structure. Here
again, many and perhaps most of these result not from the administration
of rehabilitation by acompensation authority, but from the administration
of rehabilitation services in conjunction with a compensation system that
is etiologically based.
Perhaps the major problem is timing . While the connection with the
compensation system probably results in speedier rehabilitation in most
cases, it can create delays in some. If there is a delay in adjudication,
perhaps to determine etiology, there may be a consequential delay in the
commencement of rehabilitation until it has been decided whether the ,
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disability is compensable . A similar problem arises outside the workers'
compensation context . For example, in relation to disability insurance,
cases arise in which the insurer delays the provision of equipment to see
what government services will provide, and vice versa.
The converse problem may arise towards the end of a claim . The
recovery of a patient and the termination of compensation benefits, or the
assessment of a pension, do not as a matter of law terminate eligibility for
rehabilitation services," but they often have that effect in practice .
Another concern is that this structure may restrict a patient's ordi-
nary freedom of choice, sometimes to the extent of becoming a serious
intrusion on civil liberties . This risk is at its height when periodic pay
ments are measured by reference to actual loss of earnings . In connection
with the administration of rehabilitation services by welfare authorities, it
has been argued that:
Invariably, the tendency will be for dispensers to seek or assume greater control
over recipients . The greater the control, the greater the ability to minimize costs .
But the greater the control exercised by dispensers, the less will be the freedom
enjoyed by recipients . 117
In its worst form, this control can make rehabilitation services a euphe-
mism for benefit control by punitive surveillance .
Where rehabilitation services departments of workers' compensation
boards operate properly, the rehabilitation consultants identify suitable
jobs and assist the claimants in obtaining them . What has happened at
some boards, however, is that claimants are required to make a daily job
search as a condition of continuing eligibility for benefits, and to report to
the board a minimum number of job solicitations made in each time
period . A claimant must do this, notwithstanding that the board, through
the use of its own resources and experience, has been unable to identify
any suitable employment for which he might apply. It is hard to conceive
of anything more debilitating, or more counter-productive in relation to
genuine rehabilitaiton, than to require a client to subject himself to a
process of constant rejection.
Another problem with the structure is that vocational rehabilitation is
sometimes pursued to the exclusion of other social goals. s$ Indeed, the
rehabilitation services departments of some workers' compensation boards
are actually named vocational rehabilitation departments . Moreover, there is
a propensity for return to the pre-injury employment to be perceived
automatically as the primary goal . Typically, the priorities are listed as :
se TG . Ison, Workers' Compensation in Canada (1983), para . 277.
87 Canadian Civil Liberties Association, Civil Liberties and the Administration of
Public Welfare (1970), p. 1 . See also Comment, A Model Negative Income Tax Statute
(1978), 78 Yale Law Journal 269, at p. 282.
ss See, e.g ., E.M . Ross, Rehabilitation and Workmen's Compensation (1975), 23
Occupational Health Nursing 14, at p . 15 .
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(1) return to the pre-injury occupation with the pre-injury employer;
(2) return to some other suitable employment with the pre-injury
employer ;
(3) placement in some other suitable employment.89
This approach tends to exclude other dimensions of social rehabilitation
(such as recreational activity or domestic adjustment) either as indepen-
dent goals, or as a prelude to employment . This approach may also
overlook the potential risk of the pre-injury employment as a cause of
further injury, and whether some alternative employment might not be
healthier for the claimant in the long run. Again:
Many workers would like to embark on, a career change following injury for reasons
that may not be understood.by or even explained to doctors orrehabilitation consul-
tants, but the rehabilitation process tends io' expect their return to the previous
occuaption . 90
Another influence of the compensation system on re-employment is
experience rating . It can create an incentive for an employer to assist in
getting a disabled worker back to . work, but it can also increase the
anxieties of a disabled worker by creating suspicions . If the employer's
motivation is the reduction of compensation costs (which would be short-
term), the re-employment offered to the worker might not be secure and
healthy in the long run.
A more severe problem arises if rehabilitation is associated with a
compensation system that does not pay benefits for partial disability . In
this connection, there has been a trend in recent years for disability
insurers to seek involvement in rehabilitation programs, even.to the extent
of arguing that they should be part of "the rehabilitation team" . Any such
role creates obvious conflicts of interest, andthe claim to such a role may
well be a cause of anxiety to a patient, particularly if his attending
physician appears to acquiesce. Where a policy of disability insurance
pays ongoing benefits only for total disability, a patient may suspect that
the interest of the insurer in rehabilitation is simply to demonstrate that
the disability is less than total. Hence if a proposed rehabilitation program
is likely to result in some employment income, but of modest amount or
uncertain continuity, the patient might be tempted to resist .
Conclusions
Present systems of compensation for disablement do not appear to inflict
therapeutic damage on any broad scale. Indeed, systems under which
benefits generally commence very quickly, such as the Canadian systems
sy See, e.g ., Annual Report of the Workers' Compensation Board for the Yukon for
1980, p . 4.
v° C .M. Brodsky, Compensation Illness as a Retirement Channel (1971), 19 Journal
of the American Geriatrics Society 51 .
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of workers' compensation, have a broad beneficial influence in relieving
clients from financial anxiety . Nevertheless, compensation systems do
produce significant therapeutic damage in some cases . The therapeutic
significance of compensation structures is, therefore, sufficiently impor-
tant that it should be considered in any revisions of system design . This
consideration is most likely to occur when a system is revised through
careful contemplation by people who can see the impact of the options on
the system as a whole, and on interaction with other systems . It is least
likely to occur when a system is revised by ad hoc responses to lobbying
pressures, guided primarily by the political pragmatism of the moment.
While a switch from etiologically-based sytems to a universal and
comprehensive system of compensation for disablement is desirable for
other reasons, 9l it would also have therapeutic advantages in :
eliminating a distorting influence on medical opinions relating
to diagnosis and etiology, thereby improving accuracy and the
prescription of treatment ;
(2) reducing the incidence of delay in the payment of claims, partic-
ularly by eliminating the delay that occurs in tort claims, thereby
reducing anxiety and disincentives to clinical or vocational
rehabilitation ;
(3) reducing psychological impairment by reducing the number of
medical examinations required and the number of physicians
involved in a case ;
(4) reducing the incidence of physical intrusion required by some
diagnostic techniques ;
(5) improving communication between claims adjudicators, rehabil-
itation consultants and claimants by facilitating greater decentral-
ization ;
(6) permitting more useful classifications to be used in the establish-
ment of clinical rehabilitation facilities while at the same time
preserving the advantages of attaching those facilities to the
compensation system .
The incidence of monetary gain is readily and perhaps grossly over-
estimated . Any medical opinion containing a diagnosis of monetary gain,
secondary gain, compensation neurosis or functional overlay should be
subjected to cross-examination, particularly to discover what symptoms
supported the diagnosis . Any such "diagnosis" reached only by exclu-
sion should be rejected .
91 See, e.g ., TG . Ison, Human Disabiilty and Personal Income, in L. Klar (ed.),
Studies in Canadian Tort Law (1977), c. 15 ; R. Lewis, Tort and Social Security : The
Importance Attached to the Cause of Disability with Special Reference to the Industrial
Injuries Scheme (1980), 43 Modern Law Rev. 514.
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To minimize the psychological dimensions of a disability, as well as
for other reasons, primary adjudication must be perceived as a thoughtful
and crucial role . ]Except for minor transitory disabilities, primary adjudi-
cation is not a role for clerical grade personnel.
The response to a doubtful claim must be one of prompt and sensi-
tive investigation. Any practice of denying doubtful claims to see if a
claimant appeals is likely to result in therapeutic damage as well as
injustice .
Any compensation payable for intangibles such as pain and suffer-
-ing, and loss of amenities of life, could be calculated by the degree of
physical impairment, using a schedule as a guide, rather than by an
open-ended intuitive judgment . This would reduce therapeutic damage as
well as improving fairness and efficiency .
Any program of abuse control should include the abuse of claimants
as well as abuse by claimants, and any program for the control of abuse
by claimants should be carefully targeted . It can include punishment for
those guilty of fraud, but it should not be so indiscriminate that every
claimant is treated with suspicion.
A compensation system that pays only for total disability is less
conducive to rehabilitation than one that pays also for partial disability .
The adversary model of adjudication has serious disadvantages when
used in relation to compensation for human disablement and death.
In workers' compensation, experience rating is a cause of therapeu-
tic damage .
